-Jyoti Panday* and Saumya Jain**
Abstract
The increasing use of telecom and Internet suspensions to maintain public order has raised significant concerns about their impact on the democratic and constitutional rights of citizens. Until 2023, various legislative acts facilitated prolonged, disproportionate, and opaque telecom and Internet shutdowns in India. In 2023, the government introduced the Telecommunications Act 2023 and, in 2024, the Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024. These new regulations provided an opportunity for the government to address the issues that persisted in the previous legislative frameworks. Nonetheless, the broader powers granted by these rules to issue suspension orders are not accompanied by clear criteria for suspensions and lack mechanisms for accountability and transparency. This paper critically analyzes the suspension regime in India to evaluate its effectiveness in balancing the state's control over communication services with the democratic rights of citizens. It aims to draw attention to various legal frameworks introduced by the state that are not only legitimizing telecom and Internet shutdowns but are also institutionalizing the power to control network services
Keywords: Internet shutdowns, Article 19, freedom of speech and expression, national security, public emergency, Telecom Suspension Rules, state control
Introduction
For six consecutive years, India has led the world in Internet shutdowns, a trend that raises profound concerns about the erosion of constitutional values and the fundamental rights of its citizens. Telecom and Internet shutdowns frequently violate the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the right to conduct any trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution. In 2023, the world’s longest recorded shutdown lasted an extraordinary 5,000 hours in Manipur, effectively cutting off access to information and silencing dissent. Such state actions not only violate democratic principles and fundamental rights but also have far-reaching consequences for the economy, freedom of the press, education, healthcare, and the overall well-being of society.
The suspension of telecom and Internet services is often justified as being necessary to maintain public order. However, in reality, shutdowns are usually based on vague and poorly defined threats that lack the specificity and proportionality required to justify such extreme measures. For instance, in September 2024, the state government suspended mobile Internet services across the whole state of Assam for several hours to prevent malpractice during a government recruitment examination. While the rule of law does not completely rule out the possibility of state-imposed telecom and Internet shutdowns, there should be clear and substantial limits on the exercise of such authority.
Until 2023, the Indian government implemented shutdowns without providing prior public notification. This lack of transparency and failure to officially document telecom and Internet shutdowns has resulted in these suspension orders remaining unchallenged. As a result, various civil society initiatives, such as the Internet Shutdown Tracker by Software Freedom Law Centre, India (SFLC.in) and the ‘#KeepItOn’ coalition of Access Now, have emerged to track these shutdowns as reported by citizens and the media. These efforts have been crucial for holding the state accountable and highlighted the need for transparency in state actions. In this article, we critically analyze the suspension regime in India to evaluate its efficacy in maintaining a balance between the state's control over communication services and the democratic rights of citizens.
Framework for Suspension of Telecom & Internet Services in India
The power to suspend the telecom and Internet services in India was contained under multiple legislative frameworks. Until 2017, section 144 of the then extant Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was being employed to impose shutdowns. It permitted the state or the central government to issue orders to prevent obstruction, annoyance, or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health, or safety, or a disturbance of public tranquility, or a riot, or an affray, but only when a lesser alternative would be inadequate. In addition to this, the government also relied on Section 5 (2) of the colonial-era Telegraph Act, which granted them the power to control communications in the interest of public order or to prevent incitement to commit an offense.
These legislations primarily provided legal authority to order suspension of telecom and Internet services. However, in 2017, the government introduced the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017 (“2017 Rules”). These rules provided a procedural framework to issue suspension orders, but the procedure was riddled with shortcomings. This became starkly evident in 2019 when the Union Government abrogated Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which granted Jammu and Kashmir (“J&K”) special status. Anticipating backlash and potential disruptions to public order, the government preemptively imposed an indefinite network shutdown in the region which lasted for 18 months. In J&K, telecom and Internet services were suspended from August 2019 and continued for 18 months, even through the COVID-19 pandemic. Although some services were partially restored, the suspension severely impacted access to critical information, telemedicine, and online education during the pandemic and beyond. It also disrupted journalism and democratic participation, effectively isolating J&K from the rest of India. This highlighted the extensive and unchecked power granted to the state under the 2017 Rules, allowing for the preemptive and indefinite suspension of telecom and Internet services.
In 2019, journalist Anuradha Bhasin filed a petition challenging the legality of the telecom and Internet shutdowns in J&K. Her petition focused on the opaque procedure and proportionality of imposing shutdowns, and the indefinite nature of these shutdowns. Addressing these issues, the Supreme Court of India in its landmark judgment of Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020), mandated that all suspension orders be made directly and reliably available to the public, enabling them to make alternative arrangements and challenge unreasonable restrictions on fundamental rights. Suspension orders should also adhere to the principle of proportionality, can not be suspended indefinitely, and must be subject to judicial review.
In November 2020, the government responded to the issue of indefinite network suspensions raised in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India by amending the 2017 Rules. The amended version, the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services Rules, 2020 (“2020 Rules”) specified that network shutdown orders can remain in operation for a maximum period of 15 days.
In 2023 the Telecommunications Act 2023 (“Telecom Act”) was enacted, repealing the Telegraph Act under which the 2017 and 2020 Rules were implemented. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Telecom Act grants the state power to order the suspension of telecom services.
The clause states that “on the occurrence of any public emergency or in the interest of public safety, the Central Government or a State Government or any officer specially authorized in this behalf by the Central Government or a State Government, may, if satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do, in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, defense and security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, or for preventing incitement to the commission of any offense, subject to such procedure and safeguards as may be prescribed, and for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order—direct that any telecommunication service or class of telecommunication services to or from any person or class of persons, to or from any telecommunication equipment or class of telecommunication equipment, or relating to any particular subject, transmitted or received by any telecommunication service or telecommunication network, shall be suspended.”
Subsequently, in November 2024, under the same clause, the Department of Telecommunications (“DoT”) introduced the Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024 (“2024 Rules”). The 2024 Rules supersede the 2017 and 2020 Rules, establishing a procedural framework under the Telecom Act to suspend telecom and Internet services.
Telecommunications Act, 2023
Despite the legislative overhaul, the 2024 Rules have not addressed the issues present in the previous frameworks. These issues allowed for prolonged, disproportionate, and opaque shutdowns. As a result, critical concerns regarding the need for a balance between individual rights and state interests, as well as a transparent approach, remain unresolved.
The following section will discuss how, instead of reforming the legal framework to prevent connectivity disruptions and the resulting harm to rights and freedoms, the 2024 Rules continue to grant the state power to suspend telecom and Internet services without meaningful checks and balances.
Expansion of State’s Authority
Under the 2024 Rules, the authority to issue suspension orders is vested in the competent authority constituted of high-ranking officials, including the Union Home Secretary for the Central Government and the Secretary to the State Government overseeing the Home Department. In case of “unavoidable circumstances” or when it is deemed “not feasible” for the competent authority to act, the rules grant discretionary powers to issue suspension orders to officers at the level of Joint Secretary or above. However, “unavoidable circumstances” and “not feasible” situations are not clearly defined under the rules which potentially empowers lower-ranking officials to issue suspension orders without clear guidelines. The absence of precise criteria not only undermines the intent of the rules to ensure fairness and balance but also opens the door to potential abuse of power.
Suspension orders undergo review by committees formed by the Central and State Governments. At the central level, the committee includes the Cabinet Secretary, the Secretary of Legal Affairs, and the Secretary of Telecommunications. At the state level, it comprises the Chief Secretary, the Secretary of Legal Affairs or Legal Remembrancer, and the Secretary to the State Government, excluding the Home Secretary. These rules perpetuate a glaring conflict of interest by ensuring that both the competent authority and the review committee are composed of officials within the Executive branch at similar ranks. This setup undermines one of the principles of natural justice which states that no one should be made a judge in their own case. The absence of parliamentary or judicial oversight in the review committee further exacerbates this problem, starkly contradicting democratic norms and increasing the risk of biased decision-making and unchecked executive power.
The issue of a homogeneous review committee persisted in the 2017 Rules. Moreover, the Supreme Court ruling in the Anuradha Bhasin case fell short in addressing the composition of the Review Committee. It failed to recognize the need for an inclusive committee comprising non-executive members, such as retired judges and public representatives, to ensure impartial and balanced decision-making. This leaves critical concerns of an executive overreach without proper checks and balances unaddressed. This unresolved problem reflects a persistent gap in ensuring an independent oversight mechanism.
Ambiguity in the Grounds for Carrying out Suspension
In India, network services are frequently suspended as a preemptive measure rather than in response to specific incidents or threats. This approach significantly lowers the threshold for imposing shutdowns, with justifications often based on perceived or suspected risks rather than tangible threats. A notable example of this was the network shutdown imposed in Assam to prevent malpractices during examinations.
Similar to the 2017 Rules, the 2024 Rules also cite broad and undefined reasons for suspensions—such as "public emergency," "public safety," the "sovereignty" and "integrity" of India, "defense" and "security" concerns, "friendly relations with foreign states," "public order," and the prevention of incitement to offenses. However, neither the Telecom Act nor the Rules provide clear definitions or guidelines for these terms.
When interpreting these terms, authorities imposing suspensions routinely neglect to consider the proportionality of such measures and their economic and social consequences. This oversight, coupled with vague justifications, has allowed the state to expand its power without accountability to the public. Moreover, the absence of safeguards against executive overreach and the lack of judicial oversight makes it difficult to prevent orders from being passed on unjust grounds—often driven by trivial or political motives rather than legitimate national security concerns.
Temporal Limit on Suspension Orders
The 2024 Rules, like the 2020 Rules, limit suspensions to a maximum of 15 days. While this provision aims to address the Supreme Court's ruling against indefinite shutdowns in the Anuradha Bhasin case, it overlooks the significant impact even short-term suspensions can have on citizens' constitutional rights. Moreover, these rules do not clarify whether orders can be renewed after 15 days, creating the potential for indefinite suspensions. This ambiguity was evident in Manipur, where telecom and Internet services were suspended for 142 days starting in May 2023 through the repeated issuance of 5-day suspension orders. To prevent such abuses, there must be an explicit provision for the renewal of suspension orders or the consecutive issuance of new orders for the same region.
Meaningless Review Process
The 2024 Rules allow the implementation of suspension orders before obtaining approval from the review committee. To assess the compliance of issued orders with Section 20 of the Act, the rules mandate the review committee to meet within five days of the issuance of such orders. In case of non-compliance, the review committee may order to set aside the issued orders. However, the rules fail to provide a clear review mechanism for suspension orders lasting less than five days. In case the review committee utilizes the full five-day timeframe for reviewing suspension orders, suspension orders lasting one or two days may likely have already been implemented and concluded before any unlawful suspensions are identified and addressed. This undermines the effectiveness and purpose of the review committee, compromising the core principles of oversight and accountability. Suspension of services must not proceed without rigorous scrutiny, and no order should be executed without prior approval from the review committee. This will ensure that the justification for any suspension is carefully examined and validated before action is taken.
Conclusion
Despite numerous rulings by Indian courts against disproportionate telecom and Internet shutdowns across India, the new Telecom Act and the subsequent Rules continue to overlook the widespread violation of constitutional rights and democratic values these suspensions cause. Far from protecting fundamental rights, the Telecom Act facilitates the unchecked exercise of state power. Under the pretext of public interest and national security, it institutionalizes telecom and Internet suspensions and creates a fertile ground for arbitrary and unjustified actions. The principle that the state can unilaterally decide when to suspend services—without clear justification—undermines democratic and constitutional guarantees designed to safeguard individual freedoms. This troubling trend exposes a regulatory framework that prioritizes state control over civil liberties, fostering an environment of executive overreach and authoritarianism.
*Jyoti Panday is Regional Director, Asia at the Internet Governance Project (IGP) at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Her research focuses on the political economy of digital platforms and services, as well as AI policy analysis, particularly where it intersects with internet governance, data governance, and international trade in semiconductors. Before joining IGP, Jyoti was with the Telecom Centre of Excellence at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (IIMA). She has previously served as Asia Policy Fellow for the Electronic Frontier Foundation and is the author of the 2017 UNESCO Media Freedom Report for Asia Pacific. Jyoti has helped develop the Manila Principles, a framework of baseline safeguards and best practices to guide development of intermediary liability regimes for third-party content.
**Saumya Jain is a Research Fellow at the Internet Governance Project (IGP) at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Her research focuses on telecommunications, media, and platform governance.
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